← ImplicitEx Architecture and Security Overview
Architecture and Security Overview
ImplicitEx — Technical Review Packet
Document v0.2 — Draft, 2026-07-23 Prepared byAntoine Dennison, ImplicitEx — connect@implicitex.com Reference Blockaid Ticket #1290666 / #1290665 Scope Deployed production application — Polygon mainnet, chain ID 137

1 Executive Summary

ImplicitEx is a non-custodial USDC transfer interface operating on Polygon (chain ID 137). It allows a sender to transfer USDC to a recipient address they specify. A platform fee of 1% is charged on each transfer. The production portal currently limits transfers to 250.00 USDC, making the highest fee reachable through the supported interface 2.50 USDC. The application does not hold, route through, or control user funds beyond what the user explicitly authorizes through their own wallet.

This document was prepared in response to Blockaid tickets #1290666 and #1290665 concerning the classification of the ImplicitEx USDC approval request as deceptive. The sections below document the complete transaction lifecycle, deployed security controls, fee mechanics, and independently verifiable on-chain evidence available for review.

Why the wallet requests an approval

USDC is an ERC-20 token. ERC-20 tokens cannot be spent by a smart contract without the token holder first granting a spending allowance to that contract. The approve() call is the standard ERC-20 mechanism for establishing this permission. The allowance requested equals exactly the amount the user has already reviewed on-screen: the recipient amount plus the platform fee. No additional buffer is requested.

Why the approval amount is exact rather than unlimited

Many applications request an unlimited or large blanket allowance to avoid requiring a new approval on each transaction. ImplicitEx does not do this. The allowance request is calculated per transaction and covers only the current transfer total. After the contract calls transferFrom(), the allowance returns to zero. The user's residual exposure is zero after each transaction completes.

Why the contract is non-custodial

The smart contract does not hold funds at any point in the transfer. The transferWithFee() function issues two safeTransferFrom() calls in a single atomic execution: one from the sender directly to the recipient, and one from the sender directly to the treasury. The contract is not an intermediate holder. If either call fails, the entire transaction reverts and no funds move.

Audit status
This document does not constitute a third-party security assessment. ImplicitEx has not undergone an independent audit at this stage. The verification evidence presented in Section 8 is internal. This is stated explicitly in Section 9.

2 System Architecture

2.1 Component map

User Browser
     │
     ▼
ImplicitEx Transfer Portal
(https://implicitex.com  /  https://portal.implicitex.com)
     │
     ├──── Reads on-chain state via public JSON-RPC
     │     (polygon-bor-rpc.publicnode.com, chain ID 137)
     │
     ▼
MetaMask or WalletConnect-compatible wallet
     │
     ├──── Prompt 1 of 2: User signs USDC approve() for exact total debit
     │
     └──── Prompt 2 of 2: User signs transferWithFee() execution
               │
               ▼
    ImplicitExTransfer contract
    0x5015841D6E665e63Ea174aD6b8FeF854026dE0C0
               │
               ├────► Recipient (address entered by user)
               │       Receives: transfer amount
               │
               └────► Treasury
                       0xa7cE4232811021d2Dd01f4f0f264Df2427ab3919
                       Receives: platform fee (1% of transfer amount)

2.2 Domains

DomainRoleStatus
https://implicitex.com Primary production domain Live
https://portal.implicitex.com Transfer portal, direct entry point Live
https://implicitex-236f2.web.app Firebase staging URL — included in original Blockaid report Staging

2.3 Network parameters

ParameterValue
NetworkPolygon PoS Mainnet
Chain ID137 (hex: 0x89)
RPC endpointpolygon-bor-rpc.publicnode.com (public, no key required)
Block explorerpolygonscan.com

3 Transaction Lifecycle

The following describes a 1.00 USDC transfer. The same sequence applies at all amounts within the configured limits.

3.1 User input

The user enters a recipient Ethereum address and a transfer amount. No wallet connection is required at this stage.

3.2 Pre-flight validation (no wallet prompt)

The portal calls previewTransfer(sender, amount) on the contract. This is a read-only view call. It returns the calculated fee, total debit, sender USDC balance, current allowance, and a boolean indicating whether the transfer can proceed.

The portal also validates locally:

No wallet action is initiated during this phase.

3.3 Review screen

Before any wallet prompt is triggered, the portal presents a summary of the pending transaction:

Recipient:      0xe0B02A6d...796B
Amount:         1.000000 USDC
Platform fee:   0.010000 USDC
Total debit:    1.010000 USDC
Network:        Polygon

The user must explicitly confirm past this screen to proceed. No wallet prompt has been issued at this point.

3.4 USDC spending approval (wallet prompt 1 of 2)

The portal calls approve(contractAddress, totalDebit) on the Circle USDC token contract (0x3c499c542cEF5E3811e1192ce70d8cC03d5c3359).

MetaMask surfaces this as a "Set a spending cap for your USDC" dialog. The spending cap displayed equals the exact total debit shown on the review screen — 1.010000 USDC in this example. During the observed 2026-07-23 transaction documented in Section 7, MetaMask displayed a Blockaid warning at this stage.

The approval amount is not unlimited. It is not padded with a buffer. It matches the review screen figure precisely.

3.5 Transfer execution (wallet prompt 2 of 2)

After the approval transaction is confirmed on-chain, the portal calls transferWithFee(recipientAddress, 1000000) on the ImplicitExTransfer contract. MetaMask surfaces this as a separate contract interaction confirmation. The user must approve this second step independently.

3.6 On-chain execution

The contract executes atomically:

USDC.safeTransferFrom(sender, recipient, 1000000)   // 1.000000 USDC → recipient
USDC.safeTransferFrom(sender, treasury, 10000)      // 0.010000 USDC → treasury fee

If either call reverts, the entire transaction reverts. The contract retains nothing.

3.7 Confirmation

The portal polls for block confirmation. It displays a pending state until the transaction is confirmed on-chain, then transitions to a confirmed state. It does not report success at submission time.

3.8 Economic summary — 1.00 USDC example

FlowAmountVerified
Sender USDC deducted1.010000 USDCGate 4 smoke (2026-06-15)
Recipient USDC received1.000000 USDCGate 4 smoke, Polygonscan confirmed
Treasury fee received0.010000 USDCGate 4 smoke, Polygonscan confirmed
Contract retained0.000000 USDCGate 4 smoke, zero-custody confirmed

4 Trust Boundaries

4.1 What the application can and cannot do

CapabilityPermittedNotes
Read wallet addressYesRequired to populate sender field
Request USDC allowanceYes — exact amount onlyERC-20 standard mechanism; amount matches review screen
Execute transferWithFee()Yes — requires separate user signatureWallet presents a second, distinct confirmation
Access funds beyond approved amountNoConstrained by ERC-20 allowance model
Bypass wallet confirmationNoEvery on-chain action requires a valid user signature
Move funds without user signatureNoNo server-side signing; no key storage
Hold user funds in contractNoDirect sender→recipient and sender→treasury routing
Withdraw accumulated contract balanceNoContract holds no USDC balance; no withdrawal function
Request unlimited USDC allowanceNoApproval amount is computed per transaction
Reverse or refund a confirmed transactionNoBlockchain transactions are final; no reversal mechanism exists

4.2 User authorization sequence

Every on-chain action requires a private-key signature from the user. The wallet mediates this. The portal cannot initiate, sign, or bypass any wallet action.

Portal      →  constructs transaction parameters
Wallet      →  displays parameters to user
User        →  signs or rejects
Blockchain  →  executes only if user signature is valid and allowance is sufficient

The portal has no mechanism to sign transactions on the user's behalf, store private keys, or initiate any transaction without explicit user action at the wallet prompt.

5 Smart Contract Behavior

Contract nameImplicitExTransfer
Solidity version^0.8.24
LicenseMIT
Deployed address0x5015841D6E665e63Ea174aD6b8FeF854026dE0C0
Source fileapp-web/contracts/implicitex_transfer.sol
Polygonscan sourceVerified — https://polygonscan.com/address/0x5015841D6E665e63Ea174aD6b8FeF854026dE0C0#code

5.1 Core function: transferWithFee(address recipient, uint256 amount)

This is the only function that moves funds. Execution sequence:

  1. Rejects call if contract is paused (whenNotPaused)
  2. Applies reentrancy guard (nonReentrant)
  3. Rejects zero-address recipient
  4. Rejects contract addresses as recipients (recipient must be EOA)
  5. Enforces minimum transfer amount
  6. Enforces transfer precision (amount must be divisible by configured precision)
  7. Calculates fee: (amount × feeBasisPoints) / 10000
  8. Calls safeTransferFrom(sender, recipient, amount)
  9. Calls safeTransferFrom(sender, treasury, fee)
  10. Emits TransferExecuted event

5.2 View function: previewTransfer(address sender, uint256 amount)

Read-only. Returns five values without any state change or gas cost beyond the RPC call:

Return valueDescription
feeCalculated platform fee for this amount
totalDebitAmount + fee (the figure shown on the review screen)
balanceSender's current USDC balance
allowanceCurrent USDC allowance granted to the contract
canTransferBoolean — true if balance and allowance are sufficient

The portal calls this function before presenting the review screen and again immediately before initiating the approval step, to confirm on-chain state has not changed between input and execution.

5.3 Fee constants (compile-time constants; not administratively configurable)

ConstantValueDescription
MAX_FEE_BPS 100 Maximum fee rate, in basis points. 100 bps = 1.00%. The owner cannot set feeBasisPoints above this value. This is the only compile-time fee constraint in the deployed contract.

The deployed contract does not enforce an absolute per-transfer fee ceiling in USDC terms. The fee formula is (amount × feeBasisPoints) / 10000 with no cap on the resulting amount. The production portal's 250.00 USDC transfer ceiling (portal-enforced, not contract-enforced) limits the maximum fee reachable through the supported interface to 2.50 USDC. See Section 9 for disclosure of the future fee cap policy.

5.4 Events emitted

EventTriggered by
TransferExecuted(sender, recipient, amountSent, feeAmount, totalDebited)Every successful transferWithFee() call
TreasuryUpdated(previousTreasury, newTreasury)Owner changes the fee recipient address
FeeUpdated(previousFeeBps, newFeeBps)Owner changes the fee rate
MinTransferUpdated(previous, new)Owner changes the minimum transfer floor
PrecisionUpdated(previous, new)Owner changes the transfer precision setting
TokensRescued(token, to, amount)Owner calls rescueERC20 for a non-USDC token

5.5 Owner-controlled parameters

FunctionEffectConstraint
setTreasury(address)Update the fee recipient addressCannot be zero address
setFeeBasisPoints(uint16)Adjust the fee rateCannot exceed MAX_FEE_BPS (100)
setMinTransferAmount(uint256)Change the minimum transfer floorOwner discretion
setTransferPrecision(uint256)Change required precision divisorOwner discretion
pause()Halt all transferWithFee() callsOwner-only
unpause()Resume transfersOwner-only
rescueERC20(token, to, amount)Recover tokens sent to the contract by mistakeExplicitly reverts if token == USDC — USDC cannot be drained via this function

5.6 Ownership model

The contract uses OpenZeppelin Ownable2Step. An ownership transfer requires two transactions: the current owner nominates a new address, and that address must explicitly accept. This prevents accidental or unilateral ownership loss.

Current owner: 0x776A0D6b9F96445A38303F56d5B923e6d1FF8E97

6 Deployed Security Controls

The following controls are active in the currently deployed contract and portal. "Deployed" means the control is live in production and was verified during the Gate 4 controlled smoke (2026-06-15). "Portal-enforced" means the control is implemented in the frontend JavaScript and does not rely on the contract.

ControlMechanismLayer
Exact-amount allowance approve(contract, amount + fee) — no unlimited approval, no buffer Portal-enforced
Non-custodial routing safeTransferFrom(sender, recipient) and safeTransferFrom(sender, treasury) — contract is never an intermediate holder Contract
Reentrancy protection nonReentrant modifier on transferWithFee() Contract
Pause mechanism whenNotPaused modifier; owner can halt all transfers Contract
Zero-address rejection Recipient validated as non-zero before safeTransferFrom() Contract
EOA-only recipients Contract addresses rejected as recipients Contract
USDC drain prevention rescueERC20 explicitly reverts when token == USDC Contract
Transfer floor minTransferAmount — 1.000000 USDC at current deployment Contract
Transfer ceiling (soft launch) 250.000000 USDC per transaction — limits maximum reachable fee to 2.50 USDC at current 1% rate Portal-enforced
Two-step ownership Ownable2Step — ownership change requires explicit acceptance from new owner Contract
Chain enforcement Portal validates chain ID 137 before any wallet prompt Portal-enforced
Global and per-chain transfer gates As of 2026-07-22, the global transfersEnabled flag is true; Polygon mainnet (chain 137) is true; and Amoy testnet is false. These are frontend operating controls, not immutable contract limits. Contract-level paused() is separate and can be verified using the read-only query in Section 10.3. Portal-enforced
Atomic execution Both safeTransferFrom calls execute in one transaction; either both succeed or both revert Contract
On-chain confirmation requirement Portal displays pending state until block confirmation; does not report success at submission Portal-enforced
Flow identity token In-progress flow is invalidated on wallet account change or network change mid-session Portal-enforced

7 Observed Transaction Flow

This section documents a production portal transaction observed on 2026-07-23. It follows the user-visible lifecycle from portal initialization through transaction submission. The Blockaid warning is recorded as one observed event within the ERC-20 approval stage.

Observed transaction
Amount: 5.00 USDC · Platform fee: 0.05 USDC · Total debit: 5.05 USDC · Network: Polygon · Sender: 0xf614356f93408460b594addacc86a7fc94310f1d · Recipient: 0x5466bbA8cD334554c88F81342dDfcEc4c4A7698B
StageObserved evidence
1. Portal loadedProduction portal and Polygon chain data rendered successfully.
2. Wallet connectionMetaMask unlock, site connection request, sender address, and USDC balance.
3. Recipient validationRecipient address accepted with “Format valid” status.
4. Fee calculation5.00 USDC amount produced a 0.050000 USDC platform fee.
5. User confirmationExecute Transfer remained disabled until the user checked the explicit acknowledgement.
6. ERC-20 approval requestMetaMask presented a 5.05 USDC spending-cap request.
7. Observed Blockaid warningThe approval prompt displayed “This is a deceptive request.”
8. Transfer transaction requestAfter approval, MetaMask displayed the separate ImplicitEx contract transaction.
9. Transaction submissionThe transfer was broadcast to Polygon and assigned a transaction hash.
10. Activity recordThe portal recorded the transfer as submitted and awaiting confirmation.
11. Proof packetThe portal export recorded the approval hash, transaction hash, parties, amounts, and submitted-state settlement fields.

7.1 Portal initialization and wallet connection

ImplicitEx transfer portal loaded with Polygon chain data and the wallet disconnected
Figure 1Portal initialization. The interface and live Polygon chain data rendered before wallet connection.
MetaMask unlock prompt over the ImplicitEx portal
Figure 2MetaMask requested a local wallet unlock.
MetaMask connection request for portal.implicitex.com
Figure 3MetaMask displayed an explicit connection request for portal.implicitex.com.
ImplicitEx portal showing the connected sender and a 16.17 USDC balance
Figure 4The sender connected and the portal loaded a 16.17 USDC balance.

7.2 Recipient validation and fee calculation

ImplicitEx portal showing a recipient address with format validation
Figure 5The recipient address was entered and passed format validation.
ImplicitEx portal showing a 5 USDC amount and a 0.05 USDC fee
Figure 6The 5.00 USDC amount produced a 0.050000 USDC platform fee.
ImplicitEx portal with recipient, amount, purpose, reference, balance, and fee populated
Figure 7The transaction details were populated before execution review.

7.3 Explicit user confirmation

ImplicitEx confirmation checkbox unchecked and Execute Transfer disabled
Figure 8Execute Transfer remained disabled while the acknowledgement checkbox was unchecked.
ImplicitEx confirmation checkbox checked and Execute Transfer enabled
Figure 9The user explicitly acknowledged the recipient, amount, fee, total debit, and irreversibility; Execute Transfer then became available.

7.4 ERC-20 approval request and observed wallet warning

The portal requested a USDC allowance equal to the current transfer total. The requested cap was not unlimited and did not include an additional buffer.

MetaMask spending cap request showing the Blockaid warning and an exact 5.05 USDC cap
Figure 10During the ERC-20 approval step, MetaMask displayed a Blockaid warning indicating “This is a deceptive request.” The approval requested an exact spending cap of 5.05 USDC, matching the disclosed transfer amount (5.00 USDC) plus the platform fee (0.05 USDC). The subsequent transfer request and transaction broadcast proceeded normally.

7.5 Separate transfer transaction request

After the approval transaction completed, the portal issued the separate transferWithFee() request. This second wallet prompt identified Polygon, portal.implicitex.com, and the ImplicitEx contract.

MetaMask transaction request for the ImplicitEx contract showing an estimated 5.05 USDC debit on Polygon
Figure 11MetaMask displayed the actual transfer transaction as a separate request, with estimated changes showing a 5.05 USDC debit.

7.6 Transaction submission and Activity record

ImplicitEx Activity screen showing the 5 USDC transfer submitted and awaiting confirmation
Figure 12The portal recorded the 5.00 USDC transfer as submitted and “Awaiting confirmation.” This capture does not represent confirmed settlement.

7.7 Submitted-state proof packet

The exported proof packet records both wallet-stage and transaction-stage identifiers:

Approval hash:0x4ad31a0bc64a4ca3827e82d035405ffb40ce113886ecb1cadd501978ee6ba9ad
Transaction hash:0x0a41b0c3375c489bd91fb126a0bed07d5e783ecfcf91d0f0d391c82090edab63
ExplorerPolygonscan transaction record
Status at exportsubmitted
Block numberNot observed at export (null)
Funds movedNot resolved at export (null)
Settlement-status boundary
This evidence establishes wallet connection, validation, fee calculation, explicit acknowledgement, the exact approval cap, the observed warning, the separate transfer request, and transaction broadcast. It does not yet establish final settlement for this specific transaction. After confirmation, regenerate the proof packet so that it records status: confirmed, a non-null blockNumber, a non-null resolvedAt, and fundsMoved: true.

8 Internal Verification Evidence

Scope of this section
The evidence below reflects internal testing executed against the deployed application. It has not been reviewed or certified by an independent third party. The test suite results are developer-run. The Gate 4 transaction is independently verifiable on Polygonscan.

8.1 Test suite results

SuiteTests passedResult
Contract (Hardhat / Chai)59 / 59PASS
Observability31 / 31PASS
Analytics24 / 24PASS
Consent15 / 15PASS
Portal integrityPASS
Static reference audit631 references checkedPASS

8.2 Contract test coverage — areas exercised

The contract test suite (59 tests, Hardhat / Chai) covers the following scenarios:

8.3 Gate 4 — Mainnet controlled live smoke (2026-06-15)

A controlled transfer was executed on Polygon mainnet from the production frontend. This is the primary on-chain evidence of correct fee routing and zero-custody behavior.

Date:           2026-06-15
Network:        Polygon mainnet, chain ID 137
Site:           https://implicitex-236f2.web.app
Contract:       0x5015841D6E665e63Ea174aD6b8FeF854026dE0C0

Sender:         0x2489587C9da6EaB970a5479BA70273BA37961221
Recipient:      0xe0B02A6d9738aa36eE48004211E264b7a815796B
Treasury:       0xa7cE4232811021d2Dd01f4f0f264Df2427ab3919

Amount:         1.000000 USDC
Fee:            0.010000 USDC  (100 basis points)
Total debit:    1.010000 USDC

Transaction:    0x37fd733a7f1854740bf702aa5bf59794f4ebab0f39d2a84fb2c231c29df622d9
Block:          88565097

Polygonscan:    https://polygonscan.com/tx/0x37fd733a7f1854740bf702aa5bf59794f4ebab0f39d2a84fb2c231c29df622d9
FlowExpectedResultSource
Sender deducted1.010000 USDCConfirmedWallet balance delta
Recipient received1.000000 USDCConfirmedPolygonscan ERC-20 log
Treasury received0.010000 USDCConfirmedPolygonscan ERC-20 log
Contract retained0.000000 USDCConfirmedPolygonscan contract balance

The Polygonscan ERC-20 token transfer log for this transaction shows exactly two transfers originating from the same sender address: 1.000000 USDC to the recipient and 0.010000 USDC to the treasury. No additional transfers are present.

8.4 Gate 5 — Public launch attempt (2026-06-18)

Transfers were enabled for a first-user walkthrough on 2026-06-18. The walkthrough was halted at the USDC approval step (prompt 1 of 2) due to the Blockaid "deceptive request" classification. The transfer execution step (prompt 2 of 2) was not reached. No funds moved. Transfers were returned to disabled standby state on the same date.

The false-positive report was submitted to Blockaid on 2026-06-18 for both implicitex.com and implicitex-236f2.web.app.

9 Known Limitations

The following limitations apply to the currently deployed version. They are stated here for completeness and accuracy.

ItemCurrent status
Third-party security audit Not yet completed. An independent audit is planned as the platform scales toward broader distribution. Internal test coverage is documented in Section 8 and is not a substitute for an external audit.
Transfer reversibility Confirmed blockchain transactions cannot be reversed. ImplicitEx has no reversal, refund, or cancellation mechanism for executed transfers.
Network support Polygon mainnet (chain ID 137) only. Other networks are not supported in the current deployment.
Transfer ceiling 250.00 USDC per transaction. This is a soft launch cap enforced in the portal; it is not a contract-level constraint.
Mobile wallet compatibility MetaMask browser extension (desktop) is confirmed. MetaMask Mobile in-app browser is under active testing. A provider-sequencing issue affecting the transfer execution prompt (prompt 2 of 2) has been diagnosed and a fix has been deployed; device verification is pending.
WalletConnect Integration is implemented and active in the production codebase. Full regression testing against WalletConnect wallet providers is ongoing.
Per-transfer fee ceiling The deployed contract does not enforce an absolute fee ceiling in USDC terms. The fee formula is a flat 1% percentage with no upper bound enforced in contract code. ImplicitEx has adopted a future policy under which fees will be capped at 10.00 USDC for transfers above 1,000 USDC, but that policy has not been deployed in the current contract. The production portal's 250.00 USDC transfer ceiling prevents any user of the supported interface from reaching the amount at which the uncapped 1% formula would exceed 2.50 USDC. A future contract revision will implement the 10.00 USDC ceiling on-chain before the portal transfer ceiling is raised above 1,000 USDC.
Wallet-provider classification During the observed 2026-07-23 flow, MetaMask displayed a Blockaid warning indicating “This is a deceptive request” at the USDC spending-approval step (ticket #1290666 / #1290665). The approval requested an exact 5.05 USDC cap, and the workflow subsequently reached the separate transfer request and transaction broadcast. Final settlement for that transaction was not yet resolved in the captured proof packet.
Contract ownership Single-key Ownable2Step. Multi-signature governance is on the planning roadmap but is not deployed.

10 Reviewer Reproduction Procedure

The following verification steps can be completed independently by a Blockaid analyst without wallet connection or access to the ImplicitEx codebase.

10.1 Contract source

The deployed contract is at 0x5015841D6E665e63Ea174aD6b8FeF854026dE0C0 on Polygon mainnet (chain ID 137).

The source is verified on Polygonscan. The matched Solidity source, compiler version, optimizer settings, ABI, and constructor arguments are publicly visible at:

https://polygonscan.com/address/0x5015841D6E665e63Ea174aD6b8FeF854026dE0C0#code

The contract's verified-source status was confirmed during the deployment procedure on 2026-05-22. A Hardhat verify invocation returned that the contract had already been verified on the block explorer. Polygonscan reports that the published source compiles to bytecode matching the deployed contract, and publicly exposes the matched Solidity source, compiler configuration, ABI, and constructor arguments for the deployed address. A reviewer can inspect these directly on Polygonscan without any supplemental file attachment.

10.2 Transaction verification

The Gate 4 controlled smoke transaction is publicly accessible:

https://polygonscan.com/tx/0x37fd733a7f1854740bf702aa5bf59794f4ebab0f39d2a84fb2c231c29df622d9

In the "ERC-20 Token Txns" tab on Polygonscan, two transfers are visible originating from the same sender:

10.3 Contract state — read-only queries

The following state can be read from the deployed contract via Polygonscan "Read Contract" or any JSON-RPC client, without connecting a wallet:

FunctionExpected return
feeBasisPoints()100 (1.00%)
MAX_FEE_BPS()100 (hard-coded fee rate ceiling; owner cannot set feeBasisPoints above this value)
minTransferAmount()1000000 (1.000000 USDC)
treasury()0xa7cE4232811021d2Dd01f4f0f264Df2427ab3919
paused()Current pause state
owner()0x776A0D6b9F96445A38303F56d5B923e6d1FF8E97

10.4 Live approval flow — reviewer reproduction

Transfers are currently enabled on Polygon mainnet. The approval flow can be reproduced as follows:

  1. Connect a Polygon wallet with at least 2 USDC to https://portal.implicitex.com
  2. Enter any valid EOA recipient and an amount (e.g. 1.00 USDC)
  3. Proceed past the review screen
  4. Observe the MetaMask spending-cap prompt

The spending-cap field will display the exact total debit — not an unlimited amount, not a padded amount.

11 Addresses and Evidence Inventory

11.1 Deployed addresses — Polygon mainnet (chain ID 137)

ComponentAddress
ImplicitExTransfer contract0x5015841D6E665e63Ea174aD6b8FeF854026dE0C0
USDC (Circle native, Polygon)0x3c499c542cEF5E3811e1192ce70d8cC03d5c3359
Treasury (fee recipient)0xa7cE4232811021d2Dd01f4f0f264Df2427ab3919
Contract owner0x776A0D6b9F96445A38303F56d5B923e6d1FF8E97

11.2 Deployment record

ParameterValue
Deployment date2026-05-22
Deployment transaction:0x87593fdb3d256a4a94b3e73877ba0bc433c39e81eefc78334af6da79ff5ef1f3
Ownership transfer TX:0xd84181dbffbd4f760cfa650b2a1edb1acc17713e66bb5d6d478376dc5202d777
Ownership acceptance TX:0xd6bfb2876725391c956dbd17ec5f774f9246b50df5667e8b29e8c78305365e90

11.3 Evidence inventory

IDItemStatus
TF-01Ordered transaction-flow screenshot set (Figures 1–12)Available — captured 2026-07-23
PP-01proof-packet.v1 export for the 5.00 USDC flowAvailable — submitted state; confirmation update pending
TX-022026-07-23 transaction recordSubmitted-state hash and Polygonscan URL available
TX-01Gate 4 transfer transaction (Polygonscan)Available — publicly verifiable
TC-01Contract test suite results (59/59)Internal — available on request
TC-02Observability suite results (31/31)Internal — available on request
TC-03Analytics suite results (24/24)Internal — available on request
TC-04Static reference audit (631 references)Internal — available on request